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Abstract
Many developing countries display remarkably high degrees of urban concen-
tration, incommensurate with their levels of urbanization. The cost of excessively
high levels of urban concentration can be very high in terms of overpopulation, con-
gestion, and productivity growth. One strand in the theoretical literature suggests
that such high levels of concentration may be the result of restrictive trade policies
that trigger forces of agglomeration. Another strand in the literature, however,
points out that trade liberalization itself may exacerbate urban concentration by
favoring the further growth of those large urban centers that have better access to
international markets. The empirical basis for judging this question has so far been
weak: in the existing literature, trade policies are poorly measured (or not mea-
sured as when trade volumes are used spuriously). Here, we use new disaggregated
tariﬀ measures to empirically test the hypothesis. We also employ a treatment-
and-control analysis of pre- versus post-liberalization performance of the cities in
liberalizing and non-liberalizing countries. We ﬁnd evidence that, controlling for,
among others, largest cities that have ports and, thus, have better access to ex-
ternal markets, liberalizing trade does lead to a reduction in urban concentration.
Finally, by using a cross-country level of analysis we provide some external validity
to the more careful empirical studies that rely on single country data.
∗Address: Department of Economics, Florida International University, FL 33199, USA, telephone:
305-348-3285, e-mail: karayalc@ﬁu.edu.
†Address: Department of Economics, Florida International University, FL 33199, USA, telephone:
305-348-2316, e-mail: hakan.yilmazkuday@ﬁu.edu.
1 Introduction
How does trade liberalization aﬀect urban concentration? This is an important question
because many developing countries display a remarkable degree of urban concentration
and protectionist trade policy has been suggested as one possible cause, resulting in one
or two cities overshadowing all other urban areas in a given country. Figures 1a and 1b
oﬀer some suggestive examples using two measures of urban concentration, namely per-
centage of urban population in the largest city and Herﬁndahl index of city populations,
for some developing (and developed) economies in 1985. The concentrations observed
are by no means recent phenomena. Around 1930, when developing market economies
had an average level of urbanization of around twelve percent, sixteen percent of their
urban population lived in fourteen large cities that had populations of more than half a
million. Similar levels of urban concentration in the developed world had been attained
in 1880, when its average level of urbanization stood much higher at twenty three per-
cent. The number of the large cities in the developing world as well as their share of
the total urban population increased radically between 1930 and 1980, by which date
they had 43% of the urban population, a number which paralleled that of the devel-
oped countries. However, the level of urbanization in the latter stood at 65% whereas
developing market economies had an urbanization level half of that.1 Furthermore, as
a recent survey puts it [s]ince primate cities are invariably national capitals, they are
centers of decision-making and opinion-forming. They are thus able to dominate their
countries both economically and politically (Balchin et al. 2000, p. 64).
Policymakers and international agencies are concerned about the cost of overpopu-
lation, congestion, crime, and unbalanced urban hierarchies in these megacities.2 The
literature in urban and development economics points out that though a high degree
of urban concentration might be useful in early stages of development by conserving on
economic infrastructure and enhancing information spillovers at precisely the point when
infrastructure and information are at a premium, it results in a misallocation of resources
at later stages of development.3 This is because once a certain level of urban concentra-
tion is attained, economies of scale get exhausted and mega-cities transform into sites
that are excessively congested with high infrastructure costs. The consequences of this
misallocation are not only static but dynamic. For instance, Henderson (2003) provides
evidence that supports the notion that excessive urban concentration has signiﬁcant
1For these numbers, see Bairoch (1988).
2See, for instance, UN (1993) and the World Development Report (2000).
3See Williamson (1965) and Hansen (1990).
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negative eﬀects on productivity growth.
Given the importance of the consequences of excessive urban concentration, the nat-
ural question to explore is its causes. We now have an extensive literature that argues
that observed levels of urban concentration arise from the nature of political institu-
tions and the policy choices that follow (Ades and Glaeser, 1995; Krugman and Livas,
1996; Henderson and Becker, 2000; Davis and Henderson, 2003). Here, one argument
is that national governments may favor certain cities over others. The favorites may
be capital cities (Mexico City, Seoul, London or Paris) or the traditional seats of the
elites (Istanbul or Sao Paulo). Such favoritism may take the form of underinvestment
in provincial transport or telecommunications networks, restrictions in ﬁnancial markets
and transactions, preferential treatment of elites in favored cities in the allocation of
licenses, quotas, production and trading rights, as well as the disproportionate provision
of local public services.4
Another argument proﬀered along these lines, and the one which we empirically test
in this paper, is that mega-cities may arise from the restrictive trade policies adopted.
The literature on the eﬀects of trade policy on urban concentration consists of two
generations of models. The new generation of models diﬀers in two respects from the
older generation. It relaxes the assumption of perfectly competitive markets favored by
the older generation and endogenizes regional scale economies that remain exogenous
in the older models. Both generations contain models that either assume locations
within countries to be identical or introduce some sort of nonhomogeneity in inherent
characteristics across locations.
With identical locations across the national space, the eﬀects of trade on urban
concentration work through diﬀerent channels depending on the speciﬁcations adopted
in a given model. The early literature as exempliﬁed by Henderson (1982) ﬁnds that
with perfect competition and external regional economies of scale, protection applied
to industries in large cities raises urban concentration by attracting resources to these
industries. In the New Economic Geography (NEG) literature where markets are taken
to be monopolistically competitive and economies of scale are endogenized, whether
trade liberalization leads to more or less urban concentration depends on the relative
strength of the agglomeration and dispersion forces introduced. In our context it is useful
4Through several political economy channels, excessive urban concentration may in turn have nega-
tive consequences on economic outcomes. Karayalcin and Ulubasoglu (2011) provide evidence that the
stiﬂing of political competition in economies with high urban concentrations lead to low developmental
outcome measures.
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to think of the agglomeration forces coming into play in the following manner. When
trade barriers are high, monopolistically competitive ﬁrms that produce for the domestic
market prefer to locate as close to a large number of consumers (backward linkages) found
in a metropolis. Firms would also prefer the metropolis as it would oﬀer better access
to other ﬁrms that supply inputs for the production process and consumption goods for
their workers (forward linkages). Trade liberalization would then increase the share of
goods bought from and sold to abroad and thus reduce the strength of the backward and
forward linkages. To the extent that diﬀerent cities have similar access to foreign markets
and goods, trade would then lead to a weakening of the logic of agglomeration and to
the dispersion of ﬁrms and consumers across urban centers. Other things being equal,
dispersion forces impose a limit on how far urban concentration would be able to go.
In Krugman and Livas (1996) these take the form of exogenous urban congestion costs
which are independent of the level of trade and are dominated by agglomeration forces.
Behrens et al. (2007) introduces two additional forces of dispersion. One arises from
the assumed immobility of some workers (farmers) across regions that would induce
ﬁrms and mobile industrial workers to spread out to be close to the farmers to avoid
the costly long-distance shipment of food or manufactured goods. This is the dispersion
force of the original Krugman (1991) model. A second one arises from the assumption
that markups fall with the intensity of local competition.5 Thus, ﬁrms would prefer to
spread out spatially to avoid reduced proﬁts caused by lower markups in cities with high
ﬁrm concentrations. Papers, such as Monfort and Nicolini (2000) and Paluzie (2001),
that predict that trade liberalization, once it exceeds a certain threshold, would induce
higher levels of urban concentration rely on the intensity of the dispersion forces falling
faster than that of the agglomeration forces. Papers, such as Krugman and Livas (1996)
and Behrens et al. (2007), that reach the opposite conclusion have built in to their
structure the reverse conﬁguration of the two opposing forces.
With locations that diﬀer in some dimension from others additional considerations
arise. Rauch (1991), working in the perfectly competitive setup introduces diﬀerential
trade costs across cities. In autarkic equilibrium the location of cities would be incon-
sequential with the result that all cities would be of equal size. When trade costs are
at an intermediate level, cities with lower trade costs (border cities, port cities) would
be bigger than the internal cities. Further trade liberalization would lead to even larger
cities at the border and a higher level of urban concentration. Mansori (2003) obtains
a similar result within the NEG framework as the cost of access to foreign markets
5This is the assumption introduced in Ottaviano et al. (2002).
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provides another channel through which agglomeration forces reveal themselves. Bru-
elhart et al. (2004) and Crozet and Konig (2004) build models that show that trade
liberalization may attract domestic ﬁrms to the border (or port cities) which have while
lower trade costs, these ﬁrms may also move to the interior regions where they face less
competition from foreign ﬁrms. Thus, once again whether trade liberalization increases
urban concentration becomes an empirical question.6
The mechanisms discussed so far operate in static setups. Trade liberalization, how-
ever, has dynamic consequences mainly because it raises the rate of growth of GDP.
The seminal work of Williamson (1965) argued that we should expect there to be a
non-monotonic relationship between rising income levels and urban concentration. At
low levels of income urban concentration would be high as this would help conserve
expenditure on infrastructure and enhance information spillovers at a point when the
economy suﬀers from a severe scarcity of infrastructure and information. With higher
incomes, it becomes possible to spread the infrastructure and information into the hin-
terland, while rising costs in congested urban areas push producers and consumers out
of these erstwhile centers. This pattern of income growth, resulting initially in higher
and later in lower urban concentration, is supported by a number of empirical studies
(El-Shaks 1972; Rosen and Resnick 1980; Wheaton and Shishido 1981; Mutlu 1989; Ades
and Glaeser 1995; Junius 1999; Davis and Henderson 2003; and Moomaw and Alwosabi
2004).
The question as to whether trade liberalization intensiﬁes the forces of urban ag-
glomeration or dispersion, then, becomes an empirical one. The empirical literature on
the subject may be divided into two groups.7 The ﬁrst group relies on cross-country
regressions, while the second one studies heterogeneous responses of diﬀerent regions
within a country. One remarkably consistent ﬁnding that emerges from the ﬁrst group
is that trade openness has no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on urban concentration. The
results obtained by the studies in the second group are mixed, with half of the fourteen
papers surveyed in Bruelhart (2011) ﬁnding support for the hypothesis that trade open-
ness is associated with spatial divergence and three papers suggesting the opposite. A
more careful recent study in this group by Redding and Sturm (2008), which looks at
the eﬀects of the loss of trading partners triggered by the division of Germany on urban
6See also Hanson (1998, 2001). There is now also a small literature (see Cosar and Fajgelbaum (2012)
and Allen and Arkolakis (2013)) that explores the link between trade and the spatial distribution of
population with forces that are distinct from the agglomeration ones in play in the new economic
geography literature.
7Here we follow the recent survey of this literature by Bruelhart (2011).
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concentration, ﬁnds that trade reduces urban concentration.
To understand these results it is useful to start with the second group that relies
on within-country data using a single country as its focus (and, thus faces the standard
external-validity problem). Here the typical measure of spatial concentration is either
the level or the rate of growth of regional GDP per capita (and in some cases the region-
industry share of employment). As for the measure of trade openness, it needs to be
noted that half of the papers in this group use Mexican data and use the trade liberal-
ization episode associated with NAFTA to identify the change in policy. The ﬁnding of
spatial divergence in the Mexican case is easily explained by the observation that liber-
alization shifted economic activity to regions bordering the USA. As these regions were
relatively more industrialized and richer than the rest of Mexico prior to liberalization,
it is not surprising to ﬁnd that trade exacerbated regional inequalities in general. The
instructive exception in this group is Sanguinetti and Martincus (2009) who ﬁnd that
those Argentinian manufacturing sectors that received the largest tariﬀ reductions in the
19851994 period tended to have their employment grow faster in regions that are not
usually associated with the traditional sites of manufacturing activity in and around the
main port and largest city, Buenos Aires. This result is also important because unlike
most of the non-Mexican papers in this group, Sanguinetti and Martincus use changes
in tariﬀ rates and do not depend on such endogenous measures of trade openness as
trade-to-GDP ratios. The same cannot be said for the vast majority of the papers in
the ﬁrst group. There, starting with Rosen and Resnick (1980) and Ades and Glaeser
(1995), the standard measure of trade openness is the trade-to-GDP ratio. As pointed
out in Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) using an outcome variable such as trade-to-GDP
(or imports-to-GDP) is inappropriate if we want to go beyond general correlations and
explore the causal eﬀects of trade liberalization on urban concentration (spatial conver-
gence). This is because both trade (or imports) and GDP are endogenous variables and
causal economic identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of changes in trade policy requires exogenous
instruments that are correlated with trade but not with urban concentration. This is
recognized in Ades and Glaeser (1995) where trade openness (as measured by trade-to-
GDP ratio) loses its signiﬁcance in IV regressions, thereby placing its causal eﬀect on
urban concentration in question.
In this paper, we take the question of causality seriously and diﬀer from the existing
literature by avoiding the use of endogenous outcome measures (like trade volume)
that do not correspond to any trade policy measure that is directly controlled by poli-
cymakers. We tackle these issues by adopting an improved methodology and data set to
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study the eﬀects of trade liberalization on urban concentration (spatial convergence). We
look for tariﬀ measures that are controlled by policy-makers and implement tests using
continuous treatment measures. We try to answer the right policy question and attend
to problems of causality and identiﬁcation while avoiding biases by using a diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerence approach. To put it diﬀerently, we are concerned with a treatment-and-
control partition of countries based on their engagement in trade liberalization, and
we test whether the liberalizers experienced a reduction in urban concentration.8 Our
policy experiment approach relies on identiﬁcation in the time dimension rather than
in cross section. Our trade openness data are the new and detailed Estevadeordal and
Taylor (2013) tariﬀ data on consumption, capital, and intermediate goods gathered from
primary sources (based on digital sources for recent years, but also on archival sources
for the 1980s that have not been used so far). Based on an empirical identiﬁcation
strategy where we ﬁrst use a continuous treatment measure (changes in various tariﬀs)
with a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence design and then construct two instrumental variables to
address endogeneity concerns, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant correlation between tariﬀ reductions
and declines in urban concentration following the Great Liberalization experiment of
the Uruguay Round. The results we obtain are robust to many alternative estimation
methodologies and consideration of alternative explanatory variables and can perhaps be
best visualized as in Figure 2. In that ﬁgure we trace the level of urban concentration (us-
ing the same measure as in Figure 1a) over the last 30 years for both the liberalizers and
the non-liberalizers. As the ﬁgure shows ex ante (before the Uruguay round), the level
of urban concentration of the treatment group (liberalizers) tracks that of the control
group (non-liberalizers) very closely, with there being barely any discernible diﬀerence.
If our argument is valid we should see a signiﬁcant divergence after the treatment and
this is exactly what we observe in Figure 2. With the Uruguay round of liberalization
there starts a dramatic divergence in the levels of urban concentration of the two groups,
with the treatment group of liberalizers seeing a signiﬁcant decline in its level of urban
concentration relative to that of the control group of non-liberalizers.
In the next sections, we ﬁrst develop our estimation methodology and discuss the
data in detail, where we rely on statistical methods of the treatment-control type that
are designed to avoid the typical problems that arise in cross-section methods; we also
address endogeneity concerns using novel arguments, given the fact that standard instru-
ments are not useful in this context. In the ﬁnal main section, we discuss our estimation
8We should emphasize that our focus here is squarely on urban concentration and not the more
general question of regional disparities.
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results. A concluding section ends the paper.
2 Estimation Methodology and Data
In this section, we present the estimation methodology and data, which take a diﬀerent
route from the previous empirical literature on the subject. Here, we take the question of
the relation between trade openness and urban concentration as being a question of the
causal eﬀects of a change in policy. In other words, we are interested in the consequences
of the policy of trade liberalization on urban concentration. To answer this question,
we have an empirical design in mind that considers post-1990 trade liberalization as
a treatment. Following Estevadeordal and Taylor (2013; ET hereafter), we implement
this design by employing two methods. The ﬁrst of these methods takes openness as
a continuous treatment and uses tariﬀ rates as a proxy for openness in regressions in
diﬀerences. The advantage of using diﬀerence estimators is well-known: they avoid
the problems associated with omitted variables as long as the omitted regressors do
not change over time. To the extent that these regressors are time-invariant country
characteristics, for example institutions that remain little changed over the medium
run, this method is helpful in addressing the bias associated with omitted variables.
The second method we use is an instrumental variables approach that enables us to
address potential endogeneity issues.
2.1 Openness as a continuous treatment
The literature so far has asked the question: do higher levels of trade increase or decrease
urban concentration, all else being equal? Given the impossibility of including all the
relevant controls, it is not surprising that the results obtained in the literature are fragile
and indeterminate, being marred by omitted variable bias. To this, one also needs to
add the fact that the vast majority of the papers use endogenous measures, such as
trade-to-GDP ratios, for trade openness that renders causal economic identiﬁcation of
the eﬀects of trade policies impossible.
Here, we follow an alternate strategy that takes post-1990 trade liberalization as a
treatment. The question we consider is: do the rates of growth of population of cities
in a given country accelerate relative to that of the largest city in liberalizing countries
(the treatment group) as compared to non-liberalizing ones (the control group)? This
way of posing the question not only leads to a cleaner empirical design but also naturally
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points to an estimation that involves diﬀerences in growth rates of cities, which, in turn,
has the advantage of dealing with omitted-variable bias by eliminating country-speciﬁc
ﬁxed eﬀects through diﬀerencing.
Of course, for this empirical design to work, there needs to be a group of countries
that were subject to treatment. ET cogently argue that the Uruguay round 1986-1994
provided exactly this kind of treatment: prior to the Uruguay round there were very
few developing countries that underwent any serious trade liberalization, whereas the
1986-1994 round involved 125 countries (developed and developing) that chose to reduce
tariﬀ barriers substantially. Another group of countries (the control group) had either
low tariﬀs to begin with and left them low, or had high tariﬀs and kept them high or
imposed even higher ones.9
Using the empirical design described, together with the data to be deﬁned below,
we use the fact that changes in tariﬀs during the Uruguay round provide a continuous
treatment and run the following regression:
∆ ln pi,j = α∆ ln
(
1 + tj
)
+ β ln pi,j1985 + c (1)
where the dependent variable is the change in a city-speciﬁc urban concentration measure
calculated as the rate of growth of the population of the ithmost populous city relative
to the rate of growth of population of the largest city in country j during the trade
liberalization period of 1985-2000 deﬁned as:
∆ ln pi,j =
(
ln pi,j2000 − ln pi,j1985
)
−
(
ln p1,j2000 − ln p1,j1985
)
where pim is the population of the i
th largest (i.e., most populated) city in country j in
year m. In order to capture convergence eﬀects, we include the log initial population of
the ith largest city, ln pi,j1985, as an independent variable in the regression. We also include
a constant c to capture the scale eﬀects.
We want to measure the eﬀects of a change in openness measured by a tariﬀ change
deﬁned as:
∆ ln
(
1 + tj
)
= ln
(
1 + tj2000
)
− ln
(
1 + tj1985
)
where the tariﬀ measure tj for country j is the average of the tariﬀs for imports of capital
and intermediate inputs.
The regression equation suggests that if smaller cities (i.e., cities other than the
largest city) have grown faster than the largest city in their country (i.e., if ∆ ln pi,j > 0
9See ET for a detailed discussion and list.
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on average across i) due to a decrease in tariﬀ rates (i.e., if ∆ ln (1 + tj) < 0), we would
expect to have a negative and signiﬁcant α estimate. The log initial population of the ith
largest city ln pi,j1985 has been included in the regression to capture the convergence eﬀects
among small cities, because a small city may grow faster than a bigger city (where a
bigger city is not necessarily the largest city); hence, the coeﬃcient in front of log initial
population β has an expected negative sign as well.10
We employ two alternative estimation methods, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and
Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS). While OLS is our benchmark method, we employ
TSLS to consider possible endogeneity issues. These issues arise because it may be the
case that, for instance, tariﬀ policy and urban concentration might just be reﬂections
of a deeper causal variable such as institutions. In this view, economic and political
institutions would have a causal eﬀect on urban concentration and trade (and other)
policies, which would then causally aﬀect urban concentration further. Though it is hard
to deny the purchase of such arguments when one is concerned with levels (cross section),
given the slow rate of change in and persistence of institutions over time commonly found
in the recent empirical literature (see Acemoglu et al., 2001 and 2011), one would expect
that these concerns would not be valid in diﬀerences (time series). In fact, ET show that
in the sample used here, there exists neither a clear, nor a robust relationship between
institutional changes and changes in trade policy.
However, given the fact that trade policy is a choice variable and therefore endoge-
nous, there still remains the need for a source of exogenous variation in the trade policies
of 1980s and 1990s. Here we again follow ET in taking the view that the biggest exoge-
nous shock to trade policy for the last century was the shifts in these policies in the 1930s
triggered by the Great Depression. As a whole, the argument goes, the world moved
away from liberal economic policies in the interwar period. Thus not only were tariﬀs
much higher in 1945 than in 1913 in most countries, but quotas, which had hardly been
used prior to World War I, were in wide use by the end of World War II. The creation of
GATT in 1947 and much later WTO in 1995 introduced two international institutions
charged with the reinstatement of the world trading system. Most developing countries,
however, remained highly protectionist and only a small minority of these took part in
any serious sustained trade liberalization until the Uruguay round, maintaining until
10One important detail here is that the i'th largest city in the pre-liberalization period may turn out
not to be the i'th largest city in the post liberalization period. This does not present a problem for our
analysis as we are interested in the overall ranking of cities rather than the identities of particular cities
in the ranking.
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that point with tariﬀs the levels of which dated back to the policy shift of the 1930s.
To see how this history helps us in addressing the possible endogeneity of our treat-
ment variables, note that, following ET, we would argue that an exogenous component
can be constructed in the following manner. We ﬁrst observe that the interwar shocks
led all countries towards more protectionist policies. The degree and the duration of pro-
tectionism each country adopted, however, depended on the size of the exogenous shock
they were subjected to by the Great Depression. Thus, those countries that suﬀered
less from the Great Depression had relatively lower tariﬀs and less persistent protection
later on. Furthermore, for a country to be able to see a big cut in tariﬀs later on, it
had to not only be willing to cut them, it also had to have high tariﬀs to cut in the ﬁrst
place. These considerations are taken into account in the construction of two alternative
country-speciﬁc instruments (Ij1 and I
j
2) called GATT Potential, to be used as predic-
tors of the ability and willingness of a country reduce tariﬀs under the Uruguay round.
The ﬁrst of these instruments is deﬁned as:
Ij1 = ln
(
1 + tj1985
)
× [GATT member in 1975]
This is an indicator variable that is the product of two measures that would likely pro-
mote trade liberalization. It is deﬁned as the interaction of the country's ability (proxied
by pre-Uruguay level of tariﬀs) and willingness (proxied by 1975 GATT membership) to
cut tariﬀs in the Uruguay round. For a country to institute a signiﬁcant reduction in
tariﬀs it had to have high tariﬀs to begin with and had to enter the Uruguay round with
the willingness to actually cut the tariﬀs. One could perhaps question the validity of
this instrument by arguing that the decision to enter GATT by 1975 might be correlated
with the decision to reduce tariﬀs in the Uruguay round later. If this were the case the
exclusion restriction might not hold. We would then have to search for a deeper and
perhaps historically more distant determinant of the policy stance towards trade reform.
Based on the political economy literature, ET argue that this deep determinant can be
found in the variance of the intensity of the shock suﬀered by diﬀerent economies during
the Great Depression. Reading the historical record as providing evidence for the depth
of the Great Depression shock predicting the speed of trade liberalization roughly ﬁve
decades later, we construct our second instrument as the interaction of the intensity of
Great Depression (as measured by the average deviation of 1930-35 GDP level from 1929
level) with again the pre-Uruguay tariﬀ level.
Ij2 = ln
(
1 + tj1985
)
×
 Average deviation of 1930-35
GDP level from 1929 level

10
The exclusion restriction for this instrument is expected to be valid a priori because of
two reasons: (1) the distance in time between the 1930s and the 1990s is long enough,
and (2) there is no direct link between urban concentration levels of the 1930s (which
were aﬀected by several factors, such as terms of trade shocks, speciﬁc to that era) and
those of 1980s.
Given the logic behind our instruments, we run the following regressions as the ﬁrst
stage of TSLS:
∆ ln
(
1 + tj
)
= γIjk + ϕ ln p
i,j
1985 + c for k = 1, 2
where the log initial population ln pi,j1985 is the exogenous variable in the analysis. The
coeﬃcient γ in front of the instruments representing the GATT Potential has a negative
expected sign, because higher GATT Potential leads to higher tariﬀ reductions. The
R−squared value of this ﬁrst-stage regression, together with the corresponding F-test,
can be used as an indicator for the strength of our instruments.
Our benchmark regression does not control for other confounding changes that could
be taking place within countries and could potentially aﬀect urban concentration. Ac-
cordingly, in our ﬁrst robustness analysis, we consider additional explanatory variables
(namely country-speciﬁc economic growth, country-speciﬁc economic growth squared,
dummy variables capturing the largest city being the capital city and/or a port city,
country-speciﬁc log initial domestic transportation infrastructure, and country-speciﬁc
regime change) that we will further deﬁne, below, and the regression equation is revised
as follows:
∆ ln pi,j = α∆ ln
(
1 + tj
)
+ µy∆ ln
(
yj
)
+ µy2
(
∆ ln
(
yj
))2
+ µxX
i,j
p + β ln p
i,j
1985 + c (2)
where yj represents GDP per capita, and µx is a vector of coeﬃcients capturing the
eﬀects of exogenous explanatory variables (i.e., additional explanatory variables other
than growth and growth squared) denoted by the matrix of X i,jp . We included economic
growth squared besides economic growth in order to capture any nonlinear relation
between the change in urban concentration and economic growth.11 In particular, Hen-
derson (2000) shows that urban concentration increases with per capita income up to a
certain level, declining thereafter.
Within these additional explanatory variables, the only concern is the possible en-
dogeneity of the country-speciﬁc economic growth. Therefore, in the TSLS estimation
11It is important to emphasize that we also considered only the rate of growth itself, however it was
econometrically insigniﬁcant. Such results are available upon request.
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of the robustness analysis, besides instrumenting the tariﬀ change according to the ﬁrst
stage regression of:
∆ ln
(
1 + tj
)
= γIjk + ϕxX
i,j
p + ϕp ln p
i,j
1985 + c for k = 1, 2
we also instrument country-speciﬁc economic growth ∆ ln (yj) according to the following
ﬁrst stage regression:
∆ ln
(
yj
)
= θyX
i,j
y + θxX
i,j
p + θp ln p
i,j
1985 + c (3)
where θy is a vector of coeﬃcients capturing the eﬀects of standard explanatory variables
in growth regressions (i.e., instruments in this paper) denoted by the matrix of X i,jp that
include log initial per capita income, log initial schooling, log initial institutions12, and
log initial tariﬀ rate; X i,jp and ln p
i,j
1985 enter the equation as exogenous variables.
In our benchmark regressions, in order to have a healthy comparison across the
regression results, we use information from all cities in our sample where the number of
cities diﬀer across countries and some countries are ignored due to the availability of the
data for instruments; for sure, we also consider a robustness analysis in which we use
all the available information in the data set. In an alternative robustness analysis, we
treat all countries symmetrically by using the same number of cities from each of them.
Since each country has a diﬀerent number of cities in our sample, there is a tradeoﬀ
between the maximum number of countries and the maximum number of cities from
each country; accordingly, in this robustness analysis, we consider all possible number
of cities (up to 80) from each country. We also consider another robustness analysis in
which we weight the information coming from each city of a particular country by the
inverse of the number of cities from that country.
It is important to emphasize that, in our regressions, we also account for within-
group dependence in estimating standard errors of regression parameter estimates at
the country level. We achieve this by using (and providing the p-values for) the wild
cluster bootstrap-t method developed by Cameron et al. (2008) who show that the wild
cluster bootstrap-t method is superior to its alternatives, such as using the cluster-robust
standard errors, especially when the number of clusters is low with respect to the sample
size as in this paper.
12These are among the exogenous control variables that are robustly partially correlated with eco-
nomic growth as suggested by Barro (1991) and Sala-i-Martin et al (2004).
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2.2 Data
Since we would like to test whether the liberalizers have experienced a reduction in urban
concentration, we need measures of liberalization and urban concentration. We measure
liberalization by the change in tariﬀs between pre-liberalization and post liberalization
periods (i.e., by ∆ ln (1 + tj), above). For urban concentration, earlier literature has
typically used the population in largest city (and its share of urban population). This
measure tends to ignore useful information about the dynamics of urban concentration
at lower levels of the distribution. Here, we consider an urban concentration measure at
the city level to capture the interactions among urban centers. Our (change in) urban
concentration measure employs the diﬀerences in growth rates of a given number of cities
from that of the largest city (i.e., ∆ ln pi,j, above). For example, for the U.S., in our
benchmark case, we look at the diﬀerences between the rates of growth of populations of
all other cities from that of New York City. This is similar to the measure recently used by
Redding and Sturm (2008) who study the eﬀects of the loss of trading partners triggered
by the division of Germany on urban concentration by focusing on the diﬀerences in the
rates of growth of population of border and internal cities.13
We use the following data for our empirical analysis.14
Tariﬀs: The country-speciﬁc tariﬀ data are from ET, who have compiled data on
disaggregated Most Favored Nation (MFN) applied tariﬀs for two eras that we use as
benchmarks: a pre-liberalization period circa 1985 (in practice, between 1985 and 1993),
and a post liberalization period circa 2000 (in practice, between 1999 and 2004).15 For
robustness, we consider three diﬀerent tariﬀ measures for imports of capital, intermediate
inputs, and consumption. The corresponding tariﬀ rates, before and after liberalization,
are given in Figures 3-5.
City Populations: The city-level population data refer to populations of agglom-
13Redding and Sturm (2008) ﬁnd that loss of trade leads to more urban concentration as this led to
a slower rate of growth of population for border cities. This ﬁnding is similar to ours in that we ﬁnd
that creation of trade leads to less urban concentration.
14The list of countries is as follows: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium,
Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cote d'Ivoire, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France,
Germany, Ghana, Hong Kong, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico,
Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Spain, Sri Lanka,
Sweden, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay,
Venezuela.
15ET show that tariﬀ rates in liberalizing countries have started to decline prior to the signing of the
agreement and that the decline has accelerated with it. See Figure 3 in ET.
13
erations/metropolitan areas that include a central city and neighboring towns (suburbs)
forming a connected region of dense, predominately urban population that is econom-
ically and culturally linked to the central city (e.g. by commuters).16 The data have
been downloaded from http://www.populstat.info/, http://world-gazetteer.com/, and
http://www.citypopulation.de/ for the pre-liberalization period circa 1985 (in practice,
between 1980 and 1994) and the post liberalization period circa 2000 (in practice, be-
tween 1995 and 2004).17
Instruments: In order to create country-speciﬁc instruments for tariﬀ reductions
under the Uruguay round of GATT, we use (i) GATT membership data of Rose (2004)18,
and (ii) historical GDP data of Angus Maddison covering GDP of countries (in our
sample) between 1929 and 1935.19
We use the following additional data in our robustness analysis.
GDP Per Capita: The country-speciﬁc GDP per capita data have been obtained
from PWT (rgdpch) for the years of 1985 and 2000.
Schooling: The country-speciﬁc measure of human capital has been proxied by the
total years of schooling obtained from Barro and Lee (2000). We use the log initial
version of the data in the ﬁrst-stage growth regression.
Institutions: The country-speciﬁc institutional quality is measured by the EFW
legal and property rights score (variable area 2). We use the log initial version of the
data in the ﬁrst-stage growth regression.
Capital City Dummy: The capital city dummy takes a value of 1 when the largest
city in a country is also the capital city of the country as in Ades and Glaeser (1995)
and Storeygard (2012).
Port Dummy: The port dummy takes a value of 1 when the largest city in a
country has a seaport. This dummy variable has been constructed by the authors by
checking the existence of a port in the largest city of each country in the sample. If this
is the case, the Rauch (1991) argument suggests that trade liberalization would shift
resources and population to the largest city as it beneﬁts from its increased access to
16Given the nature of an urban agglomeration, there is an unavoidable measure of arbitrariness in
the determination of its boundaries in any data set.
17Country-speciﬁc details of the data set are given in the Appendix where we depict the exact dates
and sources of data for tariﬀ rates and city-level populations for each country in our sample for the
periods of pre liberalization and post liberalization. In the Appendix, we also included a table showing
the representativeness of our country sample.
18GATT membership data of Rose (2004) has been obtained from faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/.
19Historical GDP data of Angus Maddison has been obtained from
http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/.
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foreign markets as a port city. Consequently, we would expect that urban concentration
as we measure it will rise with trade liberalization.
Initial Domestic Transportation Infrastructure: We use the percentage of
roads paved (obtained from World Development Indicators) in 1985 to measure the
initial quality of the transportation infrastructure in each country in the sample. This
variable allows us to control for the ease with which resources can move across the cities
in a given country. Higher transportation costs associated with poorer infrastructure
create incentives for the concentration of economic activity in a smaller number of cities.
Regime Change Dummy: This is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 when
dictatorship ends in a country before 1985. Following Ades and Glaeser (1995), we
accept a country as a dictatorship when its Gastil index is higher than 3. Therefore,
countries switch from a dictatorship to democracy when the Gastil index of a country
decreases from above 3 (in 1970-1974) to below 3 (in 1980-1984). We use the Gastil index
as documented in Barro and Lee (1994). This variable is important for our purposes
because the literature (see Ades and Glaeser (1995), for instance) has documented a
signiﬁcant and robust positive relationship between levels of urban concentration and
dictatorships.
3 Estimation Results
The regression results for our benchmark case are given in Table 1 where the sample
is the same across diﬀerent regressions. Estimates of α are negative and signiﬁcant
using any estimation methodology for all types of tariﬀs (except for the tariﬀ change in
consumption goods when TSLS using the ﬁrst instrument is employed20). For instance,
when the tariﬀ change in capital goods is considered, the signiﬁcantly estimated α by
OLS is about −0.71, suggesting that when tariﬀs are reduced by 1%, on average, the
cities that are smaller than the biggest city grow 0.71% faster than the biggest city in the
same country over the ﬁfteen year period between 1985 and 2000. Since the average tariﬀ
change in capital goods is about 12%, on average, smaller cities have grown about 8.4%
faster than the biggest city in their countries between 1985 and 2000 (which comes to
0.56% per annum). Similar comparisons can be calculated for alternative tariﬀ rates and
20Changes in the tariﬀs for consumption goods would in general be expected to aﬀect urban con-
centration diﬀerently than changes in the tariﬀs for intermediate and capital goods. This is because
access to intermediates is more relevant for urban agglomerations where backward and forward linkages
between ﬁrms matter as in Krugman and Livas (1996).
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estimation strategies. The estimates remain signiﬁcant when the wild cluster bootstrap-
t method (to account for within-group dependence at the country level) is considered for
which the p-values are depicted. Overall, these results suggest that trade liberalization
has led smaller cities to grow faster than the largest city across countries in our sample.
The coeﬃcient estimate β for the log of initial population is also negative and sig-
niﬁcant, as expected in Table 1. The explanatory power of the regressions measured by
R-squared is low mostly because here we ignore other channels that might aﬀect city
population growth. We obtain higher values in the following tables that report results of
our robustness analysis where we consider additional explanatory variables. For TSLS,
we can also test the strength of the instruments that we use to instrument the tariﬀ
change by looking at the details of the ﬁrst-stage regressions, which are given in Ap-
pendix Tables A2-A4. In these tables, it is evident that the instruments signiﬁcantly
enter the regressions with their expected negative signs. Moreover, for the ﬁrst-stage
regressions, the R-squared takes values up to 0.70, and the F-test results all have a
p-value of 0.00, which are both indicators of having strong instruments.
The regression results for our ﬁrst robustness analysis are given in Table 2, where
we have included per capita GDP growth, per capita GDP growth squared, capital
city dummy, port dummy, initial domestic transportation infrastructure, and a regime
change dummy in our regressions. As in the benchmark case, estimates of α are negative
and signiﬁcant using any estimation methodology for all types of tariﬀs. Therefore, our
results are robust to the consideration of additional explanatory variables. Per capita
GDP growth enters the regressions signiﬁcantly with a negative sign, while per capita
GDP growth squared signiﬁcantly enters with a positive sign. Therefore, there is in fact
evidence of a nonlinear relation between the change in urban concentration and eco-
nomic growth; i.e., in countries that have grown faster, the largest city has grown faster
than other smaller cities (i.e., urban concentration has increased).21 It is important to
emphasize that the results for the ﬁrst-stage regressions to instrument both the tariﬀ
change and the economic growth are given in Appendix Tables A5-A6; as is evident, all
considered instruments enter the ﬁrst-stage regressions signiﬁcantly, and the R-squared
values are relatively high, showing the strength of our instruments. Turning back to
Table 2, both the capital city dummy and the port dummy have negative and signif-
icant coeﬃcient estimates suggesting that when the largest city of a country is also a
port or the capital city, smaller cities have converged less to (or diverged from) that
21It is important to emphasize that we also considered only the economic growth itself, however it
was econometrically insigniﬁcant. Such results are available upon request.
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largest city in terms of population. This result reﬂects the fact that when the largest
city is also the capital city or a port city, increased trade shifts resources and population
to it and away from competing urban centers, increasing urban concentration. Initial
domestic transportation infrastructure has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect suggesting
that when transportation costs are lower within a country, smaller cities tend to beneﬁt
from the incentive to disperse economic activity. Finally, the regime change dummy
has mixed eﬀects on urban concentration, depending on the estimation methodology,
and the coeﬃcient estimateβ for the log initial population is again negative and signiﬁ-
cant as expected. The explanatory power of regressions has increased compared to the
benchmark case.22
The regression results for our second robustness analysis are given in Figures 6-8
where we have treated countries symmetrically by considering equal numbers of cities
from each of them. Since the number of cities diﬀers across countries in our sample,
for additional robustness we consider all possible numbers of cities from each country;
therefore, each point at the horizontal axes of Figures 6-8 corresponds to a particular
regression that we have run. The results show that estimates of α are almost always
negative and signiﬁcant using any estimation methodology for all types of tariﬀs (except
for the case using the tariﬀ change in consumption goods together with the ﬁrst instru-
ment in Figure 8). Hence, our main result that trade liberalization leads to lower urban
concentration (in the sense that smaller cities growing faster than the largest city) across
countries is robust to many alternative estimation methodologies and consideration of
alternative explanatory variables. The explanatory power of the regressions as measured
by R-squared is also high and gets higher as we increase the (equal) number of cities
from each country (although the number of countries decreases in such a case).23
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we explore the eﬀects of trade liberalization on the change in urban
concentration. Theoretical literature on the subject identiﬁes two relevant and opposing
mechanisms. The ﬁrst of these suggests that trade liberalization may diminish the
22The regression results based on the full sample, where the sample changes across regressions due
to some missing observations of instruments, are given in Appendix Tables A7-A8; as is evident, the
estimates of α are negative and signiﬁcant in almost all cases.
23When we consider another robustness analysis in which we weight the information coming from
each city of a particular country by the inverse of the number of cities from that country, we obtain the
results in Appendix Tables A9-A10, where the estimates of α are negative and signiﬁcant in all cases.
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eﬀect of the agglomeration forces leading to the creation of megacities and thus lead to
reduced urban concentration. The second postulates that trade liberalization may lead
to the expansion of those megacities that have better access to world markets, thereby
increasing urban concentration. Empirical literature so far has been marred by the use
of endogenous measures of trade. The innovation in this paper is the careful use of
exogenous tariﬀ policy changes and instruments. We show that, controlling for, among
others, largest cities that have ports and, thus, have better access to external markets,
trade liberalization has reduced urban concentration. We also improve upon the existing
more careful empirical studies that have focused on a single country, providing some
valuable external validity by working at the cross-country level of analysis. The results
are robust to the consideration of alternative empirical methodologies and sub-samples.
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Table 1 – Estimation Results with the Same Sample across Regressions - Benchmark Analysis  
Estimation 
Methodology 
Tariff  
Change in  
Capital  
Goods 
Tariff  
Change in 
Intermediate  
Inputs 
Tariff  
Change in 
Consumption  
Goods 
Log Initial 
Population 
R-Squared 
Sample 
Size 
OLS 
-0.71* (0.00) 
[-0.82,-0.61] 
  
-0.09* (0.00) 
[-0.06,-0.05] 
0.12 2878 
 
-0.97* (0.00) 
[-1.07,-0.87] 
 
-0.10* (0.00) 
[-0.11,-0.10] 
0.16 2878 
  
-0.33* (0.00) 
[-0.42,-0.23] 
-0.09* (0.00) 
[-0.10,-0.08] 
0.10 2878 
       
       
       
TSLS 
 
using 
 
First Instrument 
-1.12* (0.01) 
[-1.25,-0.98] 
  
-0.10* (0.00) 
[-0.11,-0.10] 
0.14 2878 
 
-1.27* (0.02) 
[-1.41,-1.13] 
 
-0.11* (0.00) 
[-0.12,-0.10] 
0.15 2878 
  
-0.50* (0.00) 
[-0.64,-0.36] 
-0.09* (0.00) 
[-0.10,-0.08] 
0.10 2878 
       
       
       
TSLS 
 
using 
 
Second Instrument 
-1.08* (0.01) 
[-1.32,-0.83] 
  
-0.10* (0.00) 
[-0.11,-0.09] 
0.10 2878 
 
-1.03* (0.01) 
[-1.24,-0.81] 
 
-0.11* (0.00) 
[-0.12,-0.10] 
0.11 2878 
  
-1.26* (0.00) 
[-1.46,-1.05] 
-0.12* (0.00) 
[-0.13,-0.11] 
0.12 2878 
       
       
Notes: All regressions include a constant. * represents significance at the 10% level. The p-values (for the null hypothesis of no effect) associated with the wild 
cluster bootstrap-t method developed by Cameron et al. (2008) are given in parenthesis to the right of the corresponding estimates. The 90% confidence 
intervals are given in brackets underneath the corresponding estimates.  
Table 2 – Estimation Results with the Same Sample across Regressions - Alternative (Robustness) Analysis 
Estimation 
Methodology 
Tariff  
Change in 
Capital 
Goods 
Tariff  
Change in 
Intermediate 
Inputs 
Tariff  
Change in 
Consumption 
Goods 
Per Capita 
GDP Growth 
Per Capita 
GDP Growth 
Squared 
Capital  
City  
Dummy 
Port Dummy 
Initial 
Domestic 
Transportation 
Infrastructure 
Regime 
Change 
Log Initial 
Population 
R-Sqd 
Sample 
Size 
OLS 
-1.46* (0.00) 
[-1.58,-1.33] 
  
-4.40* (0.00) 
[-4.67,-4.13] 
4.61* (0.00) 
[4.34,4.88] 
-0.35* (0.00) 
[-0.37,-0.32] 
0.02 (0.05) 
[-0.00,0.04] 
0.88* (0.00) 
[0.83,0.94] 
0.18* (0.00) 
[0.14,0.23] 
-0.09* (0.00) 
[-0.10,-0.09] 
0.41 2878 
 
-1.38* (0.00) 
[-1.50,-1.25] 
 
-3.63* (0.00) 
[-3.92,-3.34] 
3.72* (0.00) 
[3.43,4.01] 
-0.34* (0.00) 
[-0.36,-0.31] 
0.01 (0.15) 
[-0.01,0.03] 
0.80* (0.00) 
[0.75,0.85] 
0.18* (0.00) 
[0.14,0.23] 
-0.10* (0.00) 
[-0.10,-0.09] 
0.40 2878 
  
-1.14* (0.00) 
[-1.26,-1.01] 
-4.48* (0.00) 
[-4.76,-4.20] 
4.77* (0.00) 
[4.49,5.05] 
-0.37* (0.00) 
[-0.39,-0.34] 
0.04* (0.00) 
[0.01,0.06] 
0.92* (0.00) 
[0.86,0.98] 
0.18* (0.01) 
[0.14,0.23] 
-0.09* (0.00) 
[-0.10,-0.09] 
0.38 2878 
             
             
TSLS 
 
using 
 
First 
Instrument 
-1.70* (0.00) 
[-1.87,-1.52] 
  
-3.04* (0.00) 
[-3.34,-2.74] 
3.30* (0.00) 
[2.95,3.65] 
-0.26* (0.00) 
[-0.28,-0.23] 
-0.09* (0.00) 
[-0.12,-0.07] 
0.72* (0.00) 
[0.66,0.79] 
0.18* (0.00) 
[0.14,0.23] 
-0.09* (0.00) 
[-0.10,-0.08] 
0.28 2878 
 
-1.68* (0.00) 
[-1.85,-1.51] 
 
-3.04* (0.00) 
[-3.33,-2.75] 
3.33* (0.00) 
[2.99,3.67] 
-0.26* (0.00) 
[-0.28,-0.23] 
-0.05* (0.00) 
[-0.07,-0.03] 
0.75* (0.00) 
[0.68,0.81] 
0.20* (0.00) 
[0.15,0.25] 
-0.10* (0.00) 
[-0.10,-0.09] 
0.29 2878 
  
-0.72* (0.02) 
[-0.91,-0.54] 
-2.69* (0.00) 
[-3.00,-2.38] 
2.88* (0.00) 
[2.51,3.25] 
-0.28* (0.00) 
[-0.31,-0.25] 
-0.07* (0.00) 
[-0.09,-0.04] 
0.53* (0.00) 
[0.45,0.61] 
0.18* (0.00) 
[0.14,0.23] 
-0.08* (0.00) 
[-0.09,-0.08] 
0.22 2878 
             
             
TSLS 
 
using 
 
Second 
Instrument 
-1.57* (0.00) 
[-1.86,-1.29] 
  
-2.36* (0.00) 
[-2.68,-2.05] 
2.75* (0.00) 
[2.38,3.11] 
-0.25* (0.00) 
[-0.27,-0.22] 
-0.10* (0.00) 
[-0.13,-0.08] 
0.62* (0.00) 
[0.54,0.70] 
0.17* (0.00) 
[0.12,0.22] 
-0.09* (0.00) 
[-0.10,-0.09] 
0.23 2878 
 
-1.20* (0.00) 
[-1.44,-0.97] 
 
-2.46* (0.00) 
[-2.76,-2.15] 
2.96* (0.00) 
[2.60,3.32] 
-0.24* (0.00) 
[-0.27,-0.21] 
-0.05* (0.00) 
[-0.07,0.03] 
0.56* (0.00) 
[0.49,0.63] 
0.19* (0.00) 
[0.14,0.24] 
-0.10* (0.00) 
[-0.11,-0.09] 
0.24 2878 
  
-2.24* (0.00) 
[-2.52,-1.94] 
-2.23* (0.00) 
[-2.54,-1.91] 
2.52* (0.00) 
[2.15,2.88] 
-0.31* (0.00) 
[-0.34,-0.28] 
-0.15* (0.00) 
[-0.18,-0.13] 
0.97* (0.00) 
[0.87,1.08] 
0.14* (0.00) 
[0.09,0.19] 
-0.10* (0.00) 
[-0.11,-0.10] 
0.25 2878 
             
Notes: All regressions include a constant. * represents significance at the 10% level. The p-values (for the null hypothesis of no effect) associated with the wild 
cluster bootstrap-t method developed by Cameron et al. (2008) are given in parenthesis to the right of the corresponding estimates. The 90% confidence 
intervals are given in brackets underneath the corresponding estimates. 
 
Figure 1a - Percentage of Urban Population in the Largest City 
 
Figure 1b - Herfindahl Index of City Populations 
 
Figure 2 - The Great Liberalization and the Percentage of Urban Concentration in the Largest City 
 
Notes: The average percentage of urban population in the largest city for nonliberalizers has been normalized to the corresponding average 
value for liberalizers between 1970-1985 for comparison purposes. The samples are as follows: 
 Liberalizers: Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia, India, Japan, South Korea, Sri 
Lanka, Mexico, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Taiwan, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
 Nonliberalizers: Algeria, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cote d'Ivoire, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Hong Kong, Iceland, Israel, 
Italy, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, Paraguay, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. 
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Figure 3 - Tariffs on Capital Goods - After versus Before 
 
 
Notes: The country codes in red represent liberalizers. See underneath Figure 2 for the exact list of countries. 
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Figure 4 - Tariffs on Intermediate Inputs - After versus Before 
 
 
Notes: The country codes in red represent liberalizers. See underneath Figure 2 for the exact list of countries. 
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Figure 5 - Tariffs on Consumption Goods - After versus Before 
 
 
Notes: The country codes in red represent liberalizers. See underneath Figure 2 for the exact list of countries. 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
ARG
AUS
BGD
BOL
BRA
CHL
CHN
COL ECU
IDN
IND
JPN
KOR LKA
MEX
NZL
PAK
PER
PHL
THA
TTO
TWN
URYVEN
AUTBLXCAN
CIV
DEUNK
DZA
ESPFINFRAGBR
GHA
HKG
ISL ISR
ITA
MAR
MYS
N D
NPLPRY
SGP
SWE
TUR
USA
Tariff Rates before Liberalization
T
a
ri
ff
 R
a
te
s
 a
ft
e
r 
L
ib
e
ra
liz
a
ti
o
n
 
 
45-degree line
Figure 6 - Results with Equal Number of Cities from Each Country - Tariff Change in Capital Goods 
Estimation by OLS 
 
Estimation by TSLS - First Tariff Instrument 
 
Estimation by TSLS - Second Tariff Instrument 
 
R-Squared 
 
Notes: The regressions, each corresponding to a particular point on the horizontal axes, include port dummy, domestic transportation infrastructure, regime 
change, log initial population, and a constant. Upper and lower bounds correspond to the 90% confidence intervals. 
Figure 7 - Results with Equal Number of Cities from Each Country - Tariff Change in Intermediate Inputs 
Estimation by OLS 
 
Estimation by TSLS - First Tariff Instrument 
 
Estimation by TSLS - Second Tariff Instrument 
 
R-Squared 
 
Notes: The regressions, each corresponding to a particular point on the horizontal axes, include port dummy, domestic transportation infrastructure, regime 
change, log initial population, and a constant. Upper and lower bounds correspond to the 90% confidence intervals. 
Figure 8 - Results with Equal Number of Cities from Each Country - Tariff Change in Consumption Goods  
Estimation by OLS 
 
Estimation by TSLS - First Tariff Instrument 
 
Estimation by TSLS - Second Tariff Instrument 
 
R-Squared 
 
Notes: The regressions, each corresponding to a particular point on the horizontal axes, include port dummy, domestic transportation infrastructure, regime 
change, log initial population, and a constant. Upper and lower bounds correspond to the 90% confidence intervals. 
APPENDIX (FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION) 
Table A1a - Data Sources  
Country 
Code 
Country Name 
Preliberalization 
MFN Tariff  
Post Liberalization 
MFN Tariff 
Preliberalization Population 
Post Liberalization 
Population 
ARG Argentina NAT 1985 TRAINS 2000 Populstat.info 1985 Populstat.info 1999 
AUS Australia TRAINS 1992 TRAINS 2000 Populstat.info 1991 Populstat.info 2001 
AUT Austria TRAINS 1991 TRAINS 2000 Populstat.info 1991 Populstat.info 2001 
BGD Bangladesh TRAINS 1989 TRAINS 2000 Populstat.info 1991 Populstat.info 2001 
BLX Belgium-Luxembourg TRAINS-EU 1988 TRAINS 2000 Populstat.info 1988 Populstat.info 1999 
BOL Bolivia NAT 1985 TRAINS 2000 Populstat.info 1992 Populstat.info 2001 
BRA Brazil NAT 1985 TRAINS 2000 Populstat.info 1980 Populstat.info 2000 
CAN Canada TRAINS 1989 TRAINS 2000 Populstat.info 1991 Populstat.info 2001 
CHL Chile NAT 1985 TRAINS 2000 Populstat.info 1985 Populstat.info 2000 
CHN China NAT 1985 TRAINS 2000 Populstat.info 1985 Populstat.info 2001 
CIV Cote d'lvoire TRAINS 1993 TRAINS 2001 Populstat.info 1988 Populstat.info 1998 
COL Colombia NAT 1985 TRAINS 2000 Populstat.info 1985 Populstat.info 2002 
DEU Germany TRAINS-EU 1988 TRAINS 2000 Populstat.info 1987 Populstat.info 2000 
DNK Denmark TRAINS-EU 1988 TRAINS 2000 Populstat.info 1988 Populstat.info 2000 
DZA Algeria TRAINS 1992 TRAINS 2001 Populstat.info 1987 Populstat.info 1998 
ECU Ecuador NAT 1985 TRAINS 1999 Populstat.info 1990 Populstat.info 2002 
ESP Spain TRAINS-EU 1988 TRAINS 2000 Populstat.info 1988 Populstat.info 2000 
FIN Finland TRAINS 1988 TRAINS 2000 Populstat.info 1985 Populstat.info 2001 
FRA France TRAINS-EU 1988 TRAINS 2000 Populstat.info 1990 Populstat.info 1999 
GBR United Kingdom TRAINS-EU 1989 TRAINS 2000 Populstat.info 1985 Populstat.info 1998 
GHA Ghana TRAINS 1993 TRAINS 2000 Populstat.info 1984 Populstat.info 2002 
HKG Hong Kong TRAINS 1988 TRAINS 1998 Citypopulation.de 1991 Citypopulation.de 2001 
IDN Indonesia TRAINS 1989 TRAINS 2000 Populstat.info 1990 Populstat.info 2002 
IND India TRAINS 1990 TRAINS 1999 World-gazetteer.com 1991 World-gazetteer.com 2001 
ISL Iceland TRAINS 1993 TRAINS 2001 Populstat.info 1991 Populstat.info 2001 
ISR Israel TRAINS 1993 TRAINS 2004 Populstat.info 1992 Populstat.info 2002 
ITA Italy TRAINS-EU 1988 TRAINS 2000 Populstat.info 1991 Populstat.info 2001 
JPN Japan NAT 1985 TRAINS 2000 Populstat.info 1985 Populstat.info 2000 
KOR South Korea NAT 1985 TRAINS 1999 Populstat.info 1985 Populstat.info 2000 
LKA Sri Lanka TRAINS 1990 TRAINS 2000 Populstat.info 1991 Populstat.info 2001 
MAR Morocco TRAINS 1993 TRAINS 2000 World-gazetteer.com 1994 World-gazetteer.com 2004 
MEX Mexico NAT 1985 TRAINS 2000 Populstat.info 1990 Populstat.info 2000 
MYS Malaysia TRAINS 1988 TRAINS 2001 Populstat.info 1991 Populstat.info 2000 
NLD Netherlands TRAINS-EU 1988 TRAINS 2000 Populstat.info 1988 Populstat.info 1999 
NPL Nepal TRAINS 1993 TRAINS 2000 Populstat.info 1991 Populstat.info 2001 
NZL New Zealand TRAINS 1992 TRAINS 2000 Populstat.info 1991 Populstat.info 2001 
PAK Pakistan NAT 1985 TRAINS 2001 Populstat.info 1981 Populstat.info 1998 
PER Peru NAT 1985 TRAINS 2000 Populstat.info 1981 Populstat.info 1998 
PHL Philippines NAT 1985 TRAINS 2000 Populstat.info 1980 Populstat.info 1995 
PRY Paraguay NAT 1985 TRAINS 2000 Citypopulation.de 1982 Citypopulation.de 2002 
SWE Sweden TRAINS 1988 TRAINS 2000 Populstat.info 1989 Populstat.info 2000 
THA Thailand TRAINS 1989 TRAINS 2000 Populstat.info 1980 Populstat.info 2000 
TTO Trinidad and Tobago TRAINS 1991 TRAINS 2001 Populstat.info 1990 Populstat.info 2000 
TUR Turkey TRAINS 1993 TRAINS 1999 Populstat.info 1980 Populstat.info 1997 
TWN Taiwan NAT 1985 TRAINS 2000 Populstat.info 1985 Populstat.info 2000 
URY Uruguay NAT 1985 TRAINS 2000 Populstat.info 1985 Populstat.info 2002 
USA United States TRAINS 1989 TRAINS 2000 Populstat.info 1990 Populstat.info 2000 
VEN Venezuela NAT 1985 TRAINS 2000 Citypopulation.de 1981 Citypopulation.de 2001 
Notes: NAT stands for national sources, TRAINS stands for Trade Analysis and Information System, TRAINS-EU 
stands for the EU schedule of tariffs according to TRAINS.  
Table A1b – Representativeness of the Country Sample 
 
GDP Per  
Capita 
GDP Per  
Capita Growth 
Export/GDP  
(%) 
Import/GDP  
(%) 
Urbanization 
      
Country Sample in This Paper 
     
10
th
 Percentile 442.34 -0.12 8.08 9.55 10.09 
25
th
 Percentile 1,313.77 1.55 13.32 14.84 17.43 
50
th
 Percentile 3,999.16 2.36 21.21 22.79 25.19 
75
th
 Percentile 19,866.90 3.09 30.31 33.19 39.06 
90
th
 Percentile 22,713.54 4.58 46.27 47.83 55.33 
      
      
All Countries in WDI      
10
th
 Percentile 333.05 -1.20 9.35 13.42 16.04 
25
th
 Percentile 768.69 0.47 15.19 19.90 22.20 
50
th
 Percentile 2,379.74 2.02 25.32 30.06 35.76 
75
th
 Percentile 9,502.26 2.97 42.69 52.87 53.49 
90
th
 Percentile 21,338.86 4.44 60.31 72.17 88.25 
 
     
 
Notes: The percentiles compare the country sample in this paper with the complete set of countries in the WDI 
data set on average over the period of 1970-1985. GDP per capita measures are in 2005US$. Urbanization 
corresponds to the percentage of urban concentration in the largest city. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2 – First-Stage Results of Benchmark TSLS Estimation Using The First Instrument 
  Dependent Variable  
Instruments Used 
Tariff Change in 
Capital Goods 
Tariff Change in 
Intermediate Inputs 
Tariff Change in 
Consumption Goods 
    
Initial Tariff × 
GATT Member in 1975 
-0.56 
[-0.57,-0.54] 
-0.58 
[-0.59,-0.57] 
-0.61 
[-0.62,-0.59] 
    
Log Initial Population 
-0.01 
[-0.01,-0.01] 
-0.01 
[-0.01,-0.01] 
-0.01 
[-0.01,-0.01] 
    
R-Squared 0.66 0.66 0.62 
    
Sample Size 5522 5522 5522 
    
Notes: All regressions include a constant. The 90% confidence intervals are given in brackets underneath the 
corresponding estimates.  
 
 
 
Table A3 – First-Stage Results of Benchmark TSLS Estimation Using The Second Instrument 
  Dependent Variable  
Instruments Used 
Tariff Change in 
Capital Goods 
Tariff Change in 
Intermediate Inputs 
Tariff Change in 
Consumption Goods 
    
Initial Tariff × 
Average Deviation of  
1930-35 GDP level from 
1929 level 
-3.76 
[-3.99,-3.53] 
-3.99 
[-4.18,-3.80] 
-2.64 
[-2.83,-2.45] 
    
Log Initial Population 
-0.02 
[-0.03,-0.02] 
-0.03 
[-0.03,-0.02] 
-0.03 
[-0.03,-0.03] 
    
R-Squared 0.31 0.40 0.27 
    
Sample Size 4400 4400 4400 
    
Notes: All regressions include a constant. The 90% confidence intervals are given in brackets underneath the 
corresponding estimates.  
Table A4 – First-Stage Results of Benchmark TSLS Estimation Using Both Instruments 
  Dependent Variable  
Instruments Used 
Tariff Change in 
Capital Goods 
Tariff Change in 
Intermediate Inputs 
Tariff Change in 
Consumption Goods 
    
Initial Tariff × 
GATT Member in 1975 
-0.49 
[-0.50,-0.48] 
-0.40 
[-0.42,-0.39] 
-0.44 
[-0.45,-0.42] 
    
Initial Tariff × 
Average Deviation of  
1930-35 GDP level from 
1929 level 
-2.83 
[-2.99,-2.68] 
-3.15 
[-3.30,-3.00] 
-1.89 
[-2.03,-1.74] 
    
Log Initial Population 
-0.01 
[-0.01,-0.01] 
-0.01 
[-0.01,-0.01] 
-0.01 
[-0.02,-0.01] 
    
R-Squared 0.70 0.66 0.57 
    
Sample Size 4400 4400 4400 
    
Notes: All regressions include a constant. The 90% confidence intervals are given in brackets underneath the 
corresponding estimates.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A5 – First-Stage Results of Alternative TSLS Estimation Using The First Instrument 
 Dependent Variable 
Instruments and 
Exogenous Variables 
Tariff Change in 
Capital Goods 
Tariff Change in 
Intermediate Inputs 
Tariff Change in 
Consumption Goods 
Per Capita  
GDP Growth 
     
Initial Tariff × 
GATT Member in 1975 
-0.48 
[-0.49,-0.47] 
-0.54 
[-0.55,-0.53] 
-0.50 
[-0.51,-0.49] 
 
     
Capital City Dummy 
-0.04 
[-0.05,-0.04] 
-0.06 
[-0.07,-0.06] 
-0.05 
[-0.06,-0.05] 
0.01 
[0.00,0.03] 
     
Port Dummy 
-0.02 
[-0.03,-0.02] 
-0.00 
[-0.01,-0.00] 
-0.01 
[-0.01,0.00] 
-0.08 
[-0.09,-0.08] 
     
Initial Domestic 
Transportation 
Infrastructure 
0.13 
[0.12,0.14] 
0.15 
[0.15,0.16] 
0.23 
[0.22,0.24] 
0.42 
[0.40,0.44] 
     
Regime Change 
-0.03 
[-0.04,-0.03] 
-0.06 
[-0.07,-0.06] 
-0.11 
[-0.12,-0.10] 
-0.02 
[-0.03,-0.01] 
     
Log Initial Population 
-0.00 
[-0.00,0.00] 
-0.00 
[-0.00,0.00] 
0.00 
[-0.00,0.00] 
0.02 
[0.01,0.02] 
     
Log Initial GDP Per  
Capita 
   
-0.32 
[-0.33,-0.31] 
     
Log Initial Schooling    
0.49 
[0.47,0.51] 
     
Log Initial Institutions    
0.39 
[0.37,0.41] 
     
Initial Tariff    
0.20 
[0.16,0.23] 
     
R-Squared 0.81 0.83 0.82 0.70 
     
Sample Size 3691 3691 3691 3691 
     
Notes: All regressions include a constant. The 90% confidence intervals are given in brackets underneath the 
corresponding estimates.  
 
Table A6 – First-Stage Results of Alternative TSLS Estimation Using The Second Instrument 
 Dependent Variable 
Instruments and 
Exogenous Variables 
Tariff Change in 
Capital Goods 
Tariff Change in 
Intermediate Inputs 
Tariff Change in 
Consumption Goods 
Per Capita  
GDP Growth 
     
Initial Tariff × 
Average Deviation of  
1930-35 GDP level 
from 1929 level 
-3.36 
[-3.57,-3.14] 
-3.50 
[-3.68,-3.32] 
-2.20 
[-2.35,-2.05] 
 
     
Capital City Dummy 
0.01 
[0.00,0.01] 
-0.00 
[-0.01,0.00] 
-0.01 
[-0.02,-0.01] 
-0.01 
[-0.02,0.00] 
     
Port Dummy 
-0.03 
[-0.04,-0.03] 
-0.01 
[-0.02,-0.01] 
-0.03 
[-0.04,-0.03] 
-0.11 
[-0.12,-0.10] 
     
Initial Domestic 
Transportation 
Infrastructure 
0.23 
[0.22,0.24] 
0.24 
[0.23,0.25] 
0.31 
[0.30,0.32] 
0.47 
[0.45,0.49] 
     
Regime Change 
-0.05 
[-0.06,-0.04] 
-0.05 
[-0.06,-0.04] 
-0.05 
[-0.06,-0.04] 
0.03 
[0.02,0.05] 
     
Log Initial Population 
-0.00 
[-0.01,-0.00] 
-0.01 
[-0.01,-0.01] 
-0.01 
[-0.01,-0.01] 
0.02 
[0.02,0.02] 
     
Log Initial GDP Per  
Capita 
   
-0.35 
[-0.36,-0.35] 
     
Log Initial Schooling    
0.57 
[0.56,0.59] 
     
Log Initial Institutions    
0.25 
[0.22,0.28] 
     
Initial Tariff    
0.00 
[-0.03,0.04] 
     
R-Squared 0.67 0.70 0.75 0.78 
     
Sample Size 2878 2878 2878 2878 
     
Notes: All regressions include a constant. The 90% confidence intervals are given in brackets underneath the 
corresponding estimates. 
Table A7 – Estimation Results with All Cities - Benchmark Analysis 
Estimation 
Methodology 
Tariff Change in  
Capital  
Goods 
Tariff Change in 
Intermediate Inputs 
Tariff Change in 
Consumption Goods 
Log Initial 
Population 
R-Squared 
Sample 
Size 
OLS 
-0.42* (0.00) 
[-0.49,-0.35] 
  
-0.05* (0.00) 
[-0.06,-0.05] 
0.05 5522 
 
-0.35* (0.00) 
[-0.41,-0.30] 
 
-0.05* (0.00) 
[-0.06,-0.05] 
0.05 5522 
  
-0.20* (0.00) 
[-0.24,-0.16] 
-0.05* (0.00) 
[-0.05,-0.04] 
0.04 5522 
       
       
       
TSLS 
 
using 
 
First Instrument 
-0.18* (0.01) 
[-0.27,-0.08] 
  
-0.05* (0.00) 
[-0.05,-0.04] 
0.03 5522 
 
-0.09* (0.02) 
[-0.16,-0.02] 
 
-0.04* (0.00) 
[-0.05,-0.04] 
0.03 5522 
  
0.15* (0.00) 
[0.09,0.20] 
-0.04* (0.00) 
[-0.04,-0.03] 
0.03 5522 
       
       
       
TSLS 
 
using 
 
Second Instrument 
-0.60* (0.01) 
[-0.80,-0.41] 
  
-0.06* (0.00) 
[-0.07,-0.06] 
0.05 4400 
 
-0.62* (0.01) 
[-0.78,-0.47] 
 
-0.07* (0.00) 
[-0.07,-0.06] 
0.06 4400 
  
-0.75* (0.00) 
[-0.93,-0.57] 
-0.07* (0.00) 
[-0.08,-0.06] 
0.06 4400 
       
       
Notes: All regressions include a constant. * represents significance at the 10% level. The p-values (for the null hypothesis of no effect) associated with the wild 
cluster bootstrap-t method developed by Cameron et al. (2008) are given in parenthesis to the right of the corresponding estimates. The 90% confidence 
intervals are given in brackets underneath the corresponding estimates.  
Table A8 – Estimation Results with All Cities - Alternative (Robustness) Analysis 
Estimation 
Methodology 
Tariff  
Change in 
Capital 
Goods 
Tariff  
Change in 
Intermediate 
Inputs 
Tariff  
Change in 
Consumption 
Goods 
Per Capita 
GDP Growth 
Per Capita 
GDP Growth 
Squared 
Capital  
City  
Dummy 
Port Dummy 
Initial 
Domestic 
Transportation 
Infrastructure 
Regime 
Change 
Log Initial 
Population 
R-Sqd 
Sample 
Size 
OLS 
-1.32* (0.00) 
[-1.42,-1.22] 
  
-1.05* (0.00) 
[-1.17,-0.93] 
1.49* (0.00) 
[1.35,1.63] 
-0.19* (0.00) 
[-0.21,-0.17] 
-0.09* (0.00) 
[-0.11,-0.07] 
0.51* (0.00) 
[0.47,0.55] 
-0.04* (0.00) 
[-0.06,-0.01] 
-0.08* (0.00) 
[-0.09,-0.08] 
0.27 3691 
 
-0.71* (0.00) 
[-0.79,-0.64] 
 
-0.81* (0.00) 
[-0.93,-0.69] 
1.20* (0.00) 
[1.06,1.34] 
-0.20* (0.00) 
[-0.22,-0.18] 
-0.06* (0.00) 
[-0.08,-0.04] 
0.41* (0.00) 
[0.37,0.45] 
-0.05* (0.00) 
[-0.07,-0.02] 
-0.08* (0.00) 
[-0.09,-0.07] 
0.23 3691 
  
-0.33* (0.00) 
[-0.39,-0.26] 
-0.76* (0.00) 
[-0.88,-0.64] 
1.25* (0.00) 
[1.10,1.40] 
-0.20* (0.00) 
[-0.22,-0.17] 
-0.05* (0.00) 
[-0.07,-0.03] 
0.33* (0.00) 
[0.29,0.37] 
-0.04* (0.01) 
[-0.06,-0.01] 
-0.07* (0.00) 
[-0.08,-0.07] 
0.20 3691 
             
             
TSLS 
 
using 
 
First 
Instrument 
-0.91* (0.00) 
[-1.04,-0.77] 
  
-1.20* (0.00) 
[-1.39,-1.01] 
1.87* (0.00) 
[1.61,2.13] 
-0.17* (0.00) 
[-0.19,-0.14] 
-0.10* (0.00) 
[-0.12,-0.08] 
0.42* (0.00) 
[0.38,0.47] 
0.00 (0.45) 
[-0.02,0.03] 
-0.07* (0.00) 
[-0.08,-0.07] 
0.19 3691 
 
-0.48* (0.00) 
[-0.58,-0.39] 
 
-1.12* (0.00) 
[-1.30,-0.95] 
1.90* (0.00) 
[1.66,2.15] 
-0.17* (0.00) 
[-0.19,-0.14] 
-0.07* (0.00) 
[-0.09,-0.05] 
0.35* (0.00) 
[0.31,0.40] 
0.00 (0.43) 
[-0.02,0.03] 
-0.07* (0.00) 
[-0.08,-0.06] 
0.19 3691 
  
-0.10* (0.02) 
[-0.18,-0.02] 
-0.94* (0.00) 
[-1.14,-0.75] 
1.47* (0.00) 
[1.20,1.75] 
-0.18* (0.00) 
[-0.20,-0.16] 
-0.06* (0.00) 
[-0.08,-0.04] 
0.27* (0.00) 
[0.22,0.32] 
0.01 (0.19) 
[-0.01,0.04] 
-0.06* (0.00) 
[-0.07,-0.05] 
0.15 3691 
             
             
TSLS 
 
using 
 
Second 
Instrument 
-1.57* (0.00) 
[-1.86,-1.29] 
  
-2.36* (0.00) 
[-2.68,-2.05] 
2.75* (0.00) 
[2.38,3.11] 
-0.25* (0.00) 
[-0.27,-0.22] 
-0.10* (0.00) 
[-0.13,-0.08] 
0.62* (0.00) 
[0.54,0.70] 
0.17* (0.00) 
[0.12,0.22] 
-0.09* (0.00) 
[-0.10,-0.09] 
0.23 2878 
 
-1.20* (0.00) 
[-1.44,-0.97] 
 
-2.46* (0.00) 
[-2.76,-2.15] 
2.96* (0.00) 
[2.60,3.32] 
-0.24* (0.00) 
[-0.27,-0.21] 
-0.05* (0.00) 
[-0.07,0.03] 
0.56* (0.00) 
[0.49,0.63] 
0.19* (0.00) 
[0.14,0.24] 
-0.10* (0.00) 
[-0.11,-0.09] 
0.24 2878 
  
-2.24* (0.00) 
[-2.52,-1.94] 
-2.23* (0.00) 
[-2.54,-1.91] 
2.52* (0.00) 
[2.15,2.88] 
-0.31* (0.00) 
[-0.34,-0.28] 
-0.15* (0.00) 
[-0.18,-0.13] 
0.97* (0.00) 
[0.87,1.08] 
0.14* (0.00) 
[0.09,0.19] 
-0.10* (0.00) 
[-0.11,-0.10] 
0.25 2878 
             
Notes: All regressions include a constant. * represents significance at the 10% level. The p-values (for the null hypothesis of no effect) associated with the wild 
cluster bootstrap-t method developed by Cameron et al. (2008) are given in parenthesis to the right of the corresponding estimates. The 90% confidence 
intervals are given in brackets underneath the corresponding estimates.  
Table A9 – Weighted Least Squares Estimation Results with the Same Sample across Regressions - Benchmark Analysis 
Estimation 
Methodology 
Tariff  
Change in  
Capital  
Goods 
Tariff  
Change in 
Intermediate  
Inputs 
Tariff  
Change in 
Consumption  
Goods 
Log Initial 
Population 
R-Squared 
Sample 
Size 
OLS 
-1.03* (0.00) 
[-1.16,-0.90] 
  
-0.20* (0.00) 
[-0.21,-0.19] 
0.23 2878 
 
-1.34* (0.01) 
[-1.45,-1.24] 
 
-0.21* (0.00) 
[-0.22,-0.20] 
0.27 2878 
  
-0.56* (0.00) 
[-0.66,-0.46] 
-0.19* (0.00) 
[-0.21,-0.18] 
0.18 2878 
       
       
       
TSLS 
 
using 
 
First Instrument 
-1.34* (0.01) 
[-1. 50,-1.19] 
  
-0.21* (0.00) 
[-0.22,-0.20] 
0.24 2878 
 
-1.71* (0.02) 
[-1.86,-1.55] 
 
-0.23* (0.00) 
[-0.25,-0.22] 
0.25 2878 
  
-0.74* (0.00) 
[-0.90,-0.59] 
-0.21* (0.00) 
[-0.22,-0.20] 
0.18 2878 
       
       
       
TSLS 
 
using 
 
Second Instrument 
-1.73* (0.01) 
[-1.94,-1.53] 
  
-0.26* (0.00) 
[-0.28,-0.25] 
0.20 2878 
 
-1.42* (0.01) 
[-1.60,-1.24] 
 
-0.25* (0.00) 
[-0.27,-0.24] 
0.19 2878 
  
-1.83* (0.00) 
[-2.03,-1.62] 
-0.28* (0.00) 
[-0.29,-0.26] 
0.22 2878 
       
       
Notes: Estimations are by weighted least squares where weights have been determined by "1/no. of cities from each country." All regressions include rank 
fixed effects and a constant. * represents significance at the 10% level. The p-values (for the null hypothesis of no effect) associated with the wild cluster 
bootstrap-t method developed by Cameron et al. (2008) are given in parenthesis to the right of the corresponding estimates. The 90% confidence intervals are 
given in brackets underneath the corresponding estimates.  
Table A10 – Weighted Least Squares Estimation Results with the Same Sample across Regressions - Alternative (Robustness) Analysis  
Estimation 
Methodology 
Tariff  
Change in 
Capital 
Goods 
Tariff  
Change in 
Intermediate 
Inputs 
Tariff  
Change in 
Consumption 
Goods 
Per Capita 
GDP Growth 
Per Capita 
GDP Growth 
Squared 
Capital  
City  
Dummy 
Port Dummy 
Initial 
Domestic 
Transportation 
Infrastructure 
Regime 
Change 
Log Initial 
Population 
R-Sqd 
Sample 
Size 
OLS 
-1.61* (0.00) 
[-1.80,-1.42] 
  
-2.05* (0.00) 
[-2.32,-1.79] 
2.15* (0.00) 
[1.89,2.42] 
-0.32* (0.00) 
[-0.35,-0.29] 
-0.20* (0.00) 
[-0.24,0.16] 
0.67* (0.00) 
[0.61,0.72] 
-0.07* (0.00) 
[-0.11,-0.02] 
-0.17* (0.00) 
[-0.18,-0.16] 
0.38 2878 
 
-1.97* (0.00) 
[-2.15,-1.79] 
 
-0.52* (0.00) 
[-0.85,-0.20] 
0.47* (0.00) 
[0.13,0.81] 
-0.34* (0.00) 
[-0.37,-0.31] 
-0.25* (0.00) 
[-0.28,-0.21] 
0.61* (0.00) 
[0.56,0.66] 
-0.07* (0.00) 
[-0.11,-0.03] 
-0.20* (0.00) 
[-0.21,-0.18] 
0.37 2878 
  
-1.18* (0.00) 
[-1.36,-1.01] 
-2.05* (0.00) 
[-2.33,-1.76] 
2.31* (0.00) 
[2.03,2.59] 
-0.33* (0.00) 
[-0.36,-0.30] 
-0.17* (0.00) 
[0.21,0.13] 
0.67* (0.00) 
[0.61,0.73] 
-0.03 (0.15) 
[-0.07,0.02] 
-0.18* (0.00) 
[-0.20,-0.16] 
0.34 2878 
             
             
TSLS 
 
using 
 
First 
Instrument 
-2.22* (0.00) 
[-2.41,-2.03] 
  
-1.79* (0.00) 
[-1.98,-1.60] 
1.66* (0.00) 
[1.40,1.91] 
-0.34* (0.00) 
[-0.37,-0.31] 
-0.37* (0.00) 
[-0.40,-0.33] 
0.97* (0.00) 
[0.90,1.04] 
-0.11* (0.00) 
[-0.16,-0.07] 
-0.18* (0.00) 
[-0.19,-0.17] 
0.27 2878 
 
-2.26* (0.00) 
[-2.44,-2.07] 
 
-1.77* (0.00) 
[-1.95,-1.58] 
1.57* (0.00) 
[1.32,1.83] 
-0.36* (0.00) 
[-0.39,-0.32] 
-0.30* (0.00) 
[-0.34,-0.27] 
1.00* (0.00) 
[0.93,1.07] 
-0.08* (0.00) 
[-0.13,-0.04] 
-0.20* (0.00) 
[-0.21,-0.19] 
0.27 2878 
  
-1.22* (0.02) 
[-1.44,-1.00] 
-1.68* (0.00) 
[-1.89,-1.46] 
1.65* (0.00) 
[1.36,1.94] 
-0.31* (0.00) 
[-0.34,-0.27] 
-0.34* (0.00) 
[-0.38,-0.30] 
0.76* (0.00) 
[0.67,0.86] 
-0.05* (0.00) 
[-0.10,-0.01] 
-0.17* (0.00) 
[-0.19,-0.16] 
0.21 2878 
             
             
TSLS 
 
using 
 
Second 
Instrument 
-1.44* (0.00) 
[-1.72,-1.16] 
  
-1.62* (0.00) 
[-1.85,-1.40] 
1.96* (0.00) 
[1.67,2.24] 
-0.17* (0.00) 
[-0.21,-0.14] 
-0.30* (0.00) 
[-0.33,-0.26] 
0.47* (0.00) 
[0.41,0.53] 
0.10* (0.00) 
[0.06,0.14] 
-0.19* (0.00) 
[-0.20,-0.18] 
0.22 2878 
 
-0.86* (0.00) 
[-1.09,-0.63] 
 
-1.85* (0.00) 
[-2.07,-1.63] 
2.30* (0.00) 
[2.01,2.58] 
-0.18* (0.00) 
[-0.22,-0.15] 
-0.24* (0.00) 
[-0.28,-0.21] 
0.38* (0.00) 
[0.32,0.43] 
0.13* (0.00) 
[0.09,0.17] 
-0.19* (0.00) 
[-0.20,-0.17] 
0.22 2878 
  
-2.09* (0.00) 
[-2.39,-1.78] 
-1.49* (0.00) 
[-1.71,-1.28] 
1.67* (0.00) 
[1.39,1.95] 
-0.21* (0.00) 
[-0.25,-0.18] 
-0.34* (0.00) 
[-0.37,-0.30] 
0.80* (0.00) 
[0.71,0.89] 
0.07* (0.00) 
[0.03,0.11] 
-0.20* (0.00) 
[-0.21,-0.19] 
0.24 2878 
             
Notes: Estimations are by weighted least squares where weights have been determined by "1/no. of cities from each country." All regressions include rank 
fixed effects and a constant. * represents significance at the 10% level. The p-values (for the null hypothesis of no effect) associated with the wild cluster 
bootstrap-t method developed by Cameron et al. (2008) are given in parenthesis to the right of the corresponding estimates. The 90% confidence intervals are 
given in brackets underneath the corresponding estimates.  
